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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The government appeals the August 19, 1997, order of 
the District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands 
suppressing evidence seized during a warrantless search of 
the M/V Venture Pride. We conclude that the search of the 
Venture Pride at issue in this appeal was authorized by 14 
U.S.C. S 89(a) (1994) since the Venture Pride was situated 
in U.S. territorial waters while undergoing repair. Section 
89(a) permits warrantless searches of vessels in U.S. 
territorial waters based solely upon a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity, and the government possessed the 
requisite reasonable suspicion that a search would produce 
further evidence that Venture Pride had violated U.S. 
environmental laws. We will reverse the order of the district 
court and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
On March 26, 1995, the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety 
Detachment Office in St. Thomas received a telephone call 
reporting an oil spill in Red Hook harbor, to which the 
Coast Guard dispatched Lt. Keith Janssen. Janssen 
interviewed an employee of the marina, who pointed out a 
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sheen where the oil spill had occurred, and Janssen took a 
sample of the sheen. 
 
Janssen subsequently spoke with a witness to the spill, 
who identified the Venture Pride as the offending vessel. 
The Venture Pride is owned by Varlack Ventures, Inc., and 
operates as a commercial ferry under a Coast Guard 
certificate of inspection. When the Venture Pride returned 
to Red Hook harbor, Janssen located the specific opening 
on the vessel through which the oil had flowed because a 
witness identified the location on a diagram of the vessel 
that Janssen sketched. 
 
Janssen then boarded the Venture Pride without a 
warrant and asked for the captain, who was not on board. 
He instructed the crew to arrange for the captain's return. 
Janssen received permission from a member of the crew to 
inspect the engine room, where he noted oil in the bilge. He 
also observed a hose leading from the bilge to an overboard 
fitting as well as an illegally-wired bilge pump. Janssen 
took a sample of the oil in the bilge and, after 
disembarking, of the oil from the overboard discharge 
fitting. 
 
Janssen then boarded the Venture Pride a second time 
and gave a federal letter of interest to the now-present 
captain, Hubert Fredericks, who was then on board. 
Fredericks gave Janssen a statement about the spill and 
acknowledged that he had not reported the spill in Red 
Hook harbor nor a possible spill in Cruz Bay, St. John. 
Janssen thereupon revoked the Venture Pride's certificate 
of inspection. 
 
On March 27, 1995, Janssen spoke with Antonio 
Thomas, who supervised maintenance for Varlack 
Ventures. Thomas informed him that the Venture Pride was 
in the north branch of Cruz Bay. Janssen instructed 
Thomas not to repair the Venture Pride since Coast Guard 
officers planned to photograph her the following day. On 
March 28, 1995, Janssen and another Coast Guard officer 
boarded the Venture Pride without a warrant. They 
videotaped and photographed the interior and exterior of 
the ship. Janssen noticed that a large amount of oil had 
been removed from the bilge. 
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Fredericks and Varlack Ventures were indicted for 
knowingly discharging oil into U.S. waters in violation of 33 
U.S.C. SS 1319(c)(2)(A), 1321(b)(3) (1994), failing to report 
an oil spill in violation of 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1994), and 
aiding and abetting such activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2 (1994). Varlack Ventures also was indicted for violating 
33 U.S.C. S 1319(c)(1) by negligently discharging oil into 
U.S. waters. Fredericks subsequently filed a motion to 
suppress his and the crew's statements to Janssen as well 
as evidence obtained during the two warrantless searches, 
March 26 and 28, 1995. Following an evidentiary hearing, 
the district court ruled that Fredericks's and the crew's 
statements, as well as the evidence obtained during the 
search on March 26, were admissible. The district court 
suppressed evidence obtained during the March 28 search. 
The government appeals from that portion of the district 
court order which suppresses evidence from the search on 
March 28. Varlack Ventures did not join the suppression 
motion in the district court and does not take any position 
in this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Our jurisdiction over this appeal arises under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3731 (1994). We will exercise plenary review of the district 
court's legal determinations and applications of law to 
facts. We will review the district court's factualfindings for 
clear error. See Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & 
Co., 669 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
III. 
 
Usually, our point of departure for a Fourth Amendment 
inquiry would be whether Fredericks has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the areas of his vessel searched by 
the Coast Guard; however, we have no need to decide this 
issue in the instant case. Even assuming Fredericks has 
standing, the Coast Guard officers had the requisite level of 
suspicion required for searching vessels in U.S. territorial 
waters, and no warrant was needed for the search. 
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A. 
 
Determining whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge 
a search equates to determining whether the plaintiff has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched. 
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430 
(1978).1 Since Varlack Ventures rather than Fredericks 
owns the Venture Pride, Fredericks cannot base a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on a proprietary interest 
in the boat. Instead, Fredericks's reasonable expectation of 
privacy can only arise from his position as captain of the 
vessel.2 
 
Third Circuit precedent is inconclusive regarding whether 
the captain of a ship can have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the public areas of his vessel such as the engine 
room,3 and an analysis of explicit positions taken by our 
sister courts of appeals on this issue fails to reveal any 
consistent doctrine. In United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 
632, 635 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit noted that 
a captain does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the public areas of the vessel such as the engine room 
since the Coast Guard is authorized under section 89(a)4 to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Fourth Amendment also requires that the individual manifest a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched. See California 
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988). 
Fredericks's assumption of command as captain and his exercise of 
authority over the crew manifests this subjective expectation. 
 
2. On this appeal, we will assume that Fredericks could still assert the 
prerogatives and authority as captain of the Venture Pride even though 
he was not on board from the vessel during the search on March 28. 
 
3. In United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1980), we noted 
that "the government [made] no contention that any of the defendants 
arrested on board the vessel lack standing to claim that the search and 
seizure violated the fourth amendment [sic]." Id. at 866. In United States 
v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1986), the captain consented to 
the search of the vessel. See id. at 176. 
 
4. Section 89(a) reads as follows: 
 
       (a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, 
       searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over 
       which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, 
       detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United 
States. 
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conduct administrative inspections of the public areas of 
vessels without a warrant and without any suspicion of 
wrongdoing. Lopez, 761 F.2d at 635; see United States v. 
Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).5 In 
contrast, the First Circuit in United States v. Cardona- 
Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1993), held that a captain 
does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public 
areas of the ship such as the engine room. As the First 
Circuit stated, "This interest derives from [the captain's] 
custodial responsibility for the ship, his associated legal 
power to exclude interlopers from unauthorized entry to 
particular places on board, and the doctrines of admiralty, 
which grant the captain (as well as the owner) a legal 
identity of interest with the vessel." Id. at 21. In contrast to 
this dispute, courts of appeals agree that captains and 
crew-members have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may 
       at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, 
or 
       to the operation of any law, of the United States, address 
inquiries 
       to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and 
       examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force 
       to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, 
       inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the 
       United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has 
       been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if 
       escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on 
       shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, 
if 
       it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has 
       been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or 
       any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States 
by, 
       such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel 
liable 
       to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine or 
penalty, 
       such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized. 
 
14 U.S.C. S 89(a). 
 
5. The Fourth Circuit has expressed in dicta its agreement with the 
conclusion articulated in Lopez. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 
360, 384 n.37 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating its agreement with Freeman (which 
reiterated the Lopez doctrine) but noting that the issue of the captain's 
reasonable expectation of privacy was not raised at the appellate level 
and, given the existence of probable cause, was not considered necessary 
for the decision reached). 
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the non-public areas of the ship such as personal lockers. 
See id. at 21-22; Lopez, 761 F.2d at 635; United States v. 
DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 
However, as our analysis infra explicates, we have no 
need to decide whether Fredericks enjoyed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the public areas of his vessel 
since, even if he did, the Coast Guard officers fulfilled the 
requirements for conducting a warrantless search of his 
vessel. 
 
B. 
 
Before examining the justification for the Coast Guard's 
search, we must first ascertain the Venture Pride's location 
since the standard might differ depending upon whether 
the ship was on land or in the water. The district court 
found that the Venture Pride was in drydock at the time of 
the March 28 search. However, the government claims that 
the ship was actually in the water, and the government 
cites Janssen's testimony that the ship "was in the north 
branch of Cruz bay, also referred to as the Creek." App. at 
77. Fredericks does not point to any countervailing 
testimony that supports the district court's conclusion that 
the Venture Pride was in drydock. The testimony before the 
district court was uncontested that, although the vessel 
may have been undergoing repairs, it was not in drydock 
but in the water. The district court's factual finding was 
clearly erroneous since "we are left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United 
States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1429 (11th Cir. 1989). We 
find that the Venture Pride was not in drydock but rather 
in the water during the search on March 28. 
 
C. 
 
We have previously joined our sister courts of appeals in 
interpreting section 89(a) to allow searches of vessels for 
criminal activities based upon reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. See Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 176. Since 
the Venture Pride was in the water while undergoing repair, 
it is covered by section 89(a), which authorizes searches 
"upon the high seas and waters over which the United 
 
                                7 
  
States has jurisdiction[.]" 14 U.S.C. S 89(a). Therefore, the 
Coast Guard only needed reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity in order to search the Venture Pride. See Wright- 
Barker, 784 F.2d at 176. 
 
The Coast Guard undoubtedly possessed reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity in this case. We have not 
previously defined reasonable suspicion for the purposes of 
section 89(a), but the Eleventh Circuit defines reasonable 
suspicion in the section 89(a) context as follows: 
 
       Although we examine the totality of the circumstances 
       to determine reasonable suspicion, reasonable 
       suspicion must be more than a mere generalized 
       suspicion or hunch. United States v. Pearson, 791 F.2d 
       867, 870 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991, 107 S. 
       Ct. 590, 93 L. Ed.2d 591 (1986); United States v. Reeh, 
       780 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986). Reasonable 
       suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts, 
       together with rational inferences drawn from those 
       facts, which reasonably warrant suspicion of criminal 
       activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
       884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L. Ed.2d 607 (1975). 
       Law enforcement officers may subjectively assess those 
       facts in light of their expertise. 
 
Roy, 869 F.2d at 1430. On March 26, a witness identified 
the Venture Pride as the source of the oil spill. Later that 
day, Janssen conducted his first search of the Venture 
Pride and found oil in the bilge, a hose leading from the 
bilge to an overboard fitting, and a bilge pump wired 
illegally. Finally, Fredericks gave a statement about the spill 
and admitted that he had not reported the spill in Red 
Hook harbor nor a possible spill in Cruz Bay, St. John. 
Accordingly, the Coast Guard possessed reasonable 
suspicion that it would find further evidence of criminal 
activity, meaning that the search was justified under 
section 89(a). 
 
Concerning the applicability of the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement, section 89(a) contains no provision 
requiring a warrant, nor have any courts of appeals 
required a warrant for searches based upon a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity that are conducted pursuant 
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to section 89(a). See, e.g., Williams, 617 F.2d at 1074. 
Indeed, no warrant would be required even if the search 
had taken place outside the context of section 89(a). The 
mobility of the Venture Pride gave it access to the open seas 
even though undergoing repair. This possibility of flight 
created an exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless 
search under the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285 (1925) 
("practically since the beginning of the government," no 
warrant has been required for searches of ships "because 
the [ship] can be quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought"); United 
States v. Bain, 736 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir. 1984) 
("mobility of the [docked] vessel was an exigent 
circumstance justifying an immediate search"); United 
States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(a boat in drydock could be seized by virtue of the 
automobile exception since the boat could be returned to 
the water and then flee); United States v. Weinrich, 586 
F.2d 481, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1978) (the "automobile 
exception" is justification for not requiring a warrant for 
searches of ships).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that, given that a boat's mobility creates exigent 
circumstances, the March 28 search would have been justified even if 
section 89(a) was inapplicable since the Coast Guard possessed probable 
cause to search the Venture Pride. Searches not authorized under 
section 89(a) fall under regular Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in 
which probable cause is required. We have previously defined probable 
cause "in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was 
committing an offense." Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S. Ct. 854, 862 
(1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Coast Guard possessed 
probable cause given the witness who identified the Venture Pride as the 
source of the spill and given what Janssen observed during his first 
search of the Venture Pride. The existence of probable cause, combined 
with exigent circumstance arising from the boat's mobility, justified the 
March 28 warrantless search under regular Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
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IV. 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse the August 19, 
1997, order of the district court suppressing evidence 
seized during the March 28, 1995, warrantless search of 
the Venture Pride. We will remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
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